If the EC wants to restrain race-to-the-bottom internal fiscal competition between member states -a goal that makes sense, as we know in the U.S. from studies of intrastate fiscal competition -then it cannot allow labels, such as the use of the tax system to deliver subsidies, to prevent it from doing its job. And if one is adjudicating the merits of what has already been done, then of course the decisions will apply "retroactively." If the Commission had settled for saying "OK, fine, but try it again and you'll be sorry!," it would likely have failed to deliver a credible message to EU governments.
The Commission claims to be acting within the scope of its existing authority under the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union.
1 Thus, the claim of undue retroactivity, unless it is based on expressly contesting this claim of authority within the framework of EU law, amounts to complaining that American taxpayers have been taken by surprise here. That may well have happened -but it equally happens, in U.S. tax law, whenever the Internal Revenue Service successfully uses a novel legal theory to apply existing law in ways that the adversely affected taxpayers had not anticipated. 2 In that context, U.S. legal commentators generally agree that there is no impermissible retroactivity, even though the new theory applies unexpectedly to past acts.
I would be considerably less pleased about a policy of distinctively targeting U.S.
companies. However, while this has been raised as a concern by U.S. critics of the support for the OECD-BEPS process as a whole, and for particular initiatives such as its Action 2, addressing hybrid mismatch arrangements. However, Stack has also spoken about aggressively defending U.S. positions against other countries that he says are trying to overreach at the expense of U.S. companies.
In sum, therefore, on OECD-BEPS, one side is vehemently against the process, while the other side, at best, is partially and cautiously supportive. This asymmetry reflects the fact that, if the main result of OECD-BEPS is that U.S. companies end up paying more tax to EU countries, that's not good for the U.S., at least directly, given that we don't get a share of those tax revenues. over the years, however, the relevant story starts a bit earlier, with our regulatory adoption of the check-the-box rules 8 in 1996 These rules notoriously undermined the capacity of our subpart F rules to limit foreign-to-foreign tax shifting by U.S. companies, such as from high-tax EU countries to either EU or non-EU tax havens. U.S. commentators sometimes view the check-thebox rules' international effects as an accidental byproduct of a rationalization effort that was aimed primarily at ill-functioning domestic rules that tried to distinguish between corporate and non-corporate entities. Such commentators may also, if they are in the anti-tax avoidance camp, view the rules' undermining of subpart F as a mistake that indirectly undermined U.S. efforts to protect the domestic tax base against profit-shifting. EU commentators, by contrast, have informally expressed to me a view of the check-the-box rules as reflecting a conscious U.S.
policy decision to aid U.S. companies' efforts to engage in foreign profit-shifting at the expense of high-tax EU (and other) countries.
One might ask why high-tax EU countries should need a well-functioning subpart F in order to restrain U.S. companies' profit-shifting at their expense. Why can't they simply strengthen their own source rules instead? The answer, I suspect, is that subpart F, where effective, eliminates tax competition between such countries with respect to inbound investment by U.S. multinationals. Thus, the EU state aid cases might be seen as addressing the void that we are thought deliberately to have created, twenty years ago, by weakening our subpart F rules to the detriment of our friends in the EU.
My point here is not to say who is right or wrong about all this. Rather, it is to offer suggestions regarding why people on the two sides view the EU state aid cases so differently.
Interests may differ, but so do perceptions. And it might be helpful for those on each side to have a better understanding of the thinking on the other side that creates feelings of justification and good faith, going beyond mere fiscal self-interest. House. That's just how slanted and undemocratic, with a small d as well as a large one, districting for House seats is today.
So, if the Democrats win, it's all about the presidential election because only the Treasury, through regulations, will be able to respond. In this scenario, I would expect Hillary
Clinton's international tax advisors to have similar views to those of President Obama's advisors.
Thus, they might be cautiously and selectively cooperative and constructive with respect to OECD-BEPS, and mainly just rhetorical in their response to the EU state aid cases. However, given the likely legislative impasse, OECD-BEPS cooperation would probably just be through Treasury initiatives and executive agreements. I will close, however, by taking a longer-term perspective, which looks beyond the 2016 presidential election under the optimistic premise that sanity and the rule of law will prevail here.
In the long run, I'd expect two sober reactions to the EU state aid dust-up. First, U.S.
policymakers may conclude that the U.S. has actually benefited to a degree, albeit indirectly, from EC verdicts that imposed current tax costs on U.S. companies.
Suppose U.S. companies conclude, by reason of the state aid cases, that the EU is less of a tax planning heaven than they had thought, despite their fruitful past dealings with officials in countries like Ireland and Luxembourg. This might reduce future U.S. base erosion, even wholly apart from the long-term OECD-BEPS playout. Profit-shifting out of the U.S. by U.S. companies tends to be an integrated two-stage process. First, they get the profits abroad, then they do the foreign-to-foreign tax planning that allows them to place the profits in tax havens.
The EU state aid cases potentially could undermine U.S. companies' confidence in this two-step, and this might conceivably affect, not just pure profit-shifting transactions, but even real investment choices that are complementary with it.
Second, U.S. policymakers may decide that the EU is onto something, when it focuses on base erosion by non-resident companies. The U.S. international tax rules today, as compared to those of peer countries such as Germany and the U.K., rely more heavily on residence-based rules to address profit-shifting, and less heavily on rules that are residence-neutral or that even target nonresident companies. In particular, the U.S. legal response to profit-shifting leans heavily on our CFC rules, which only apply to resident companies. For example, we have only a relatively weak rule addressing earnings-stripping, and we don't have a global debt cap.
I would assume that non-U.S. companies today do even more profit-shifting out of the U.S. than U.S. companies, simply because they can. Indeed, this is one of the two main reasons for the recent inversion wave. Would-be U.S. inverters anticipated being able to strip more profits out of the U.S. once they could get around our CFC rules more easily.
11
A shift in the U.S. response to profit-shifting, so that it focused more than it presently does on non-resident companies, might look like an indirect deferred response to the EU state aid cases. As in: "You're going after some of our companies? Great -we are going to go after some of yours." Yet it might make sense substantively even if the state aid cases had never been brought. And it has potential domestic political support, wholly apart from any notion of responding to the EU. After all, U.S. companies are often fine with U.S. tax enforcement against their foreign competitors, except insofar as they fear a spillover of the effort to target their own tax planning as well. And if the foreign multinationals have well-placed lobbyists and other friends in Washington, which is certainly possible, I myself have not as yet heard much either from them or about them.
Is this a pessimistic, quasi-trade war vision -the U.S. going after EU multinationals, while the EU is going after U.S. multinationals? It could be, but there is also an optimistic version, under which it fits into an ongoing multilateral effort to limit corporate tax base erosion and profit-shifting generally. And in any event, there are real limits to rational countries' interest in discouraging inbound investment.
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